Works in Progress:
Bringing Doctors Home: Local Admission Quotas and the Geography of Medical Talent
Aug. 2026.
I study how local admission quotas shape the college and career choice in medicine, which ultimately contributes to the spatial sorting and equity of medical talent and welfare.
I study how local admission quotas shape the college and career choice in medicine, which ultimately contributes to the spatial sorting and equity of medical talent and welfare.
Right-Sizing an All-Charter School District: An Equilibrium Analysis of New Orleans Public Schools System with Dong Woo Hahm (USC), Douglas Harris (Tulane), Qinyou Hu (UTSA), Jintao Sun (Renmin University)
Dec. 2025.
We study the equilibrium interplay between school entry and exit, student choice, value-added, and the allocation of educational resources.
We study the equilibrium interplay between school entry and exit, student choice, value-added, and the allocation of educational resources.
Innovation-Optimal Test Design: The Origins of Creativity in High-Stakes Exams with George Bai (MIT), Max Posch (Exeter)
Sep. 2025.
Innovation born in the high-stakes system: what students prepare, where talent is allocated, and who becomes an innovator.
Innovation born in the high-stakes system: what students prepare, where talent is allocated, and who becomes an innovator.
Pre-doctoral Works:
Running to Success: Long-term Returns to the High-stakes PE Exam with Shihan Weng (University of Chinese Academy of Sciences)
Presentations: NCER-CCER Conference 2025, Peking University, Tsinghua University*, Renmin University*, Zhejiang University*, Xiamen University, Beijing Normal University
Awards: Best paper award, Annual Workshop on the Economics of Education in China*; Outstanding paper award, China Frontier Forum on Labor Economics; Outstanding paper award, PKU Applied Micro PhD Conference (NSD); Best paper award, PKU Economics PhD Conference (SOE)*; Outstanding paper award, PKU Education PhD Conference*; Outstanding paper award, Zhejiang U Economics PhD Conference*
Presentations: NCER-CCER Conference 2025, Peking University, Tsinghua University*, Renmin University*, Zhejiang University*, Xiamen University, Beijing Normal University
Awards: Best paper award, Annual Workshop on the Economics of Education in China*; Outstanding paper award, China Frontier Forum on Labor Economics; Outstanding paper award, PKU Applied Micro PhD Conference (NSD); Best paper award, PKU Economics PhD Conference (SOE)*; Outstanding paper award, PKU Education PhD Conference*; Outstanding paper award, Zhejiang U Economics PhD Conference*
Sep. 2024. [Version-SSRN-202609]
Abstract: How does broadening evaluation criteria foster human capital formation? In the 1990s, China gradually introduced physical education (PE) into the High School Entrance Exam across counties, bringing the first non-academic criterion into its high-stakes selection system. Exploiting anovel dataset on policy rollout, we find that the reform increases earnings and employment 20years later among those exposed as adolescents. These gains stem from both an initial exercise response and sustained exercise habits, which contribute to an innovative mindset and emotional resilience. Additionally, the reform combines a favorable benefit-cost ratio and inclusive gains, offering practical implications for exam system design.
Abstract: How does broadening evaluation criteria foster human capital formation? In the 1990s, China gradually introduced physical education (PE) into the High School Entrance Exam across counties, bringing the first non-academic criterion into its high-stakes selection system. Exploiting anovel dataset on policy rollout, we find that the reform increases earnings and employment 20years later among those exposed as adolescents. These gains stem from both an initial exercise response and sustained exercise habits, which contribute to an innovative mindset and emotional resilience. Additionally, the reform combines a favorable benefit-cost ratio and inclusive gains, offering practical implications for exam system design.
The Centralization Paradox: Spatial Capture and the Reproduction of Patronage with Siyuan Fan (UCSD), Wenyi Lu (NYU)
Presentations: APSA Annual Conference 2026*, MPSA Annual Conference 2026*, Political Science Speaker Series 2025 Fall, UC San Diego*, Stanford*, Peking University
Funding: Expense Support from the Institute for Humane Studies (US $3,000)
Presentations: APSA Annual Conference 2026*, MPSA Annual Conference 2026*, Political Science Speaker Series 2025 Fall, UC San Diego*, Stanford*, Peking University
Funding: Expense Support from the Institute for Humane Studies (US $3,000)
Mar. 2025. [Version-SSRN-202608]
Abstract: Centralization reforms often aim to discipline local agents and curb fragmented patronage. We challenge this view that under weak institutional constraints, such reforms can producespatial capture: politically reliant firms respond to the erosion of local patronage by reallocating investment and reorganizing political brokerage toward newly empowered centers. We study China’s judicial reform, which centralized personnel and fiscal control over local courts at the provincial level. Combining a difference-in-differences design with a shift-share approach, we show that politically reliant firms reduce investment in reformed local jurisdictions and redirect capital toward provincial capitals after the reform. These firms also reorganize political brokerage: they reduce reliance on local officials and pay higher allowances to revolving-door officials with provincial-level experience. Following their spatial reallocation, they regain litigation advantages in provincial capitals, yet these political gains do not improve firm performance. Our findings reveal an endogenous limit of centralization: institutional reforms can weaken local distortions while reallocating both economic and political resources toward new centers of political advantage.
Abstract: Centralization reforms often aim to discipline local agents and curb fragmented patronage. We challenge this view that under weak institutional constraints, such reforms can producespatial capture: politically reliant firms respond to the erosion of local patronage by reallocating investment and reorganizing political brokerage toward newly empowered centers. We study China’s judicial reform, which centralized personnel and fiscal control over local courts at the provincial level. Combining a difference-in-differences design with a shift-share approach, we show that politically reliant firms reduce investment in reformed local jurisdictions and redirect capital toward provincial capitals after the reform. These firms also reorganize political brokerage: they reduce reliance on local officials and pay higher allowances to revolving-door officials with provincial-level experience. Following their spatial reallocation, they regain litigation advantages in provincial capitals, yet these political gains do not improve firm performance. Our findings reveal an endogenous limit of centralization: institutional reforms can weaken local distortions while reallocating both economic and political resources toward new centers of political advantage.
